DePaul Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1956

Article 5

Caveat Vendor - A Trend in the Law of Real Property
DePaul College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
DePaul College of Law, Caveat Vendor - A Trend in the Law of Real Property, 5 DePaul L. Rev. 263 (1956)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol5/iss2/5

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information,
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

COMMENTS

CAVEAT VENDOR-A TREND IN THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY
What maxim is more familiar than caveat emptor? How many suits
have been dismissed with hardly more than a caveat emptor? There is no
duty upon a seller to disclose material facts-caveat emptor!1 A seller is
not liable for "puffing" or seller's talk-caveat emptor!2 A buyer cannot
complain of being deceived by matters that a reasonable investigation
would uncover-caveat emptor!3 Misrepresentations are not actionable un4
less dishonestly made-caveat emptor!
Certainly this maxim in the language of Rome, the great lawgiver,
carries with it the repute of the classics and the prestige of authority.
How strange it is then, that as yet, no one seems to have discovered it in
any of the Roman writings that have survived. It is not found within the
Holy Church, or the administrative courts of guild, town or fair, nor is it
found in the law merchant. In fact, the first time it seems to appear
in print is well into the 16th century.5 Historically speaking, one would
not find caveat emptor among the reputable ideas of the middle ages because of the ideology and teachings of the Church. All trade was considered worldly and sinful, and hence condemned. At a later date, men
like St. Thomas Aquinas distinguished between a wrongful trade which
was carried on for a profit and a rightful trade which served public necessity.
As time passed, the crafts increased in number, claiming more and
more followers. In order to trade or sell their goods they created markets
and fairs. These were distinctly marked by fair prices-an honest measure
and good quality which conformed strongly to the early standards of
Christian conduct. Following them came the market towns and the formation of the guilds, each becoming more crowded and complex with each
passing year. It is here within these years that we see the break with the
Church itself, the disintegration of the monarchial system, government
regulation and the rise of industrialism. It is here that one finds the gradI In Peck v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873), Lord Cairns said there is no legal duty
to disclose facts, however morally censurable the failure to do so might be.
2 Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Manufacturing Co., 248 Fed. 853, 856 (C.A. 2d,
1918), wherein Learned Hand said that seller's talk, like the claims of campaign managers before election, are "rather designed to allay the suspicion which would attend

their absence than to be understood as having any relation to objective truth."
• Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 379, 383 (1872). The Supreme Court said, "a
court of equity will not undertake, anymore than a court of law to relieve a party
from the consequences of his own inattention or carelessness."
4 The foundation of this rule is laid down in Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51 (K.B.
1789).
5Fitzherbert, Boke of Husbandrie (1534) § 118.
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ual crumbling away of the early Christian standards of trade and in their
stead we see rising an age of rugged individualism, the mother of caveat
emptor.6 As one would expect, our maxim saw its greatest triumph here
in America. Economically, our rugged individualism was reinforced by
the raw spirit of the frontier. Our newly developed industrial system was
not to be shackled by formal control. It was every man for himself in this
country, laissez faire and caveat emptor.7
Ironically, at the turn of this twentieth century the decline of the
maxim began because of the same mass production of goods and industrialism which gave rise to it. The government began imposing regulations
to protect purchasers for the public welfare. The sellers began to stand
behind their representations and their goods and found that such honesty
was the best policy. Satisfied customers returned with more business, time
was saved and more money was made. The result was beneficial to the
seller, to the purchaser and to the country. Thus, the exceptions to our
maxim in the sale of goods grew until it might, in many respects, be said,
caveat vendor.8
Turning away from the law of sales wherein caveat emptor has been
well trounced, it is paradoxical to find it still strong and commanding as a
stern warning to all buyers of real estate.9 Land law does not seem to have
developed as the law of sales. We find the maxim applied to title,10 quality
and condition" of both leased 12 and purchased realty.1a The reason is obvious when one looks at factors affecting land law. There was no need for
a change because there was no mass production of housing, no building
0 The origin, history and development of the maxim is very well covered by Walton H. Hamilton in The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L. J. 1133-1187
(1930-31).
7 In Barnard v. Kellog, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870), Mr. Justice Davis speaking for the
Supreme Court declared caveat emptor to be of "such universal acceptance" that

with a single exception, "the courts of all the states in the union, where the common
law prevails, sanction it."
8 Lawrence Vold uses this expression in his handbook of the Law of Sales, p. 445
(1931); W. Page Keeton in his article, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 2 (1953) uses the term caveat venditor. This development away from caveat
emptor in sales law is covered in Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society,
36 Col. L. Rev. 699 (1936). Marrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey,
14 Tulane L. Rev. 327 (1940).
9 Collier v. Harkness, 26 Ga. 362 (1858); Giniblen v. Harrison, 2 Sneed 315 (Ky.
1804); Lewy v. Clark, 128 N.Y. Misc. 16, 217 N.Y. Supp. 185 (1926); Smith v. Tuckcs,
151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925); Hoskins v. Woodlam (1938) 1 All E.R. 692

(K.B.).
10 Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 N.M. 230, 114 P. 2d 740 (1941).

1Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99 (1873); Lewy v. Clark, 128 N.Y. Misc. 16, 217
N.Y. Supp. 185 (1926).
12 Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
13Tiffany Real Property § 99 p. 149 (3d Ed. 1939) and cases cited therein.

COMMENTS

boom or industrialization of the building line. The mass production of
goods which1.4defeated caveat emptor in the law of sales did not take place
in land law.
Today, there exists a different situation. The post-World War II building boom saw a great increase in the building industry and the mass production of housing. Today, there is a tremendous surge in the sale of
second-hand housing which is comparable to the mass production of
goods which earlier affected sales law. Today, thousands of people are
buying new homes and buying their homes by a new method, that is,
from description and sample or "show house."15
Having thus discussed caveat emptor historically and economically and
having some concept of its development, we might anticipate a movement
to give more protection to the purchaser in the area of land law. It is with
this thought in mind that we shall examine some of the recent decisions
with an objective of sustaining this theory.
Let us begin then with some of the basic principles of caveat emptor
and see how they have been affected today. As stated before, one basic
rule was that there was no legal duty to disclose facts, however morally
censurable the failure to do so might have been.' 6 In 1932, this position
was modified by the Restatement of Contracts.' 7 It took the position that
there was no legal duty of disclosure unless the fact concealed was one
vitally affecting the very basis of the contract and was of such a nature
that the mistake if mutual would render voidable a transaction caused by
reliance thereon.
Following this, there arose a series of cases involving real property
where the court further modified our basic proposition of non-disclosure.
The cases hold that the vendor is under a duty of disclosing material facts
which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence or which a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not un8
cover.'
14The usual method of acquiring a house was to contract for one to be built according to plan and specification. These contracts protected the purchaser since they
carried with them promises to perform in work-man-like manner. Hudson, Building
Contracts 186 (7th Ed. 1946). In addition, a buyer of real estate was protected by the
requisite, in the absence of contrary intent, of a marketable title.
15 See Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land For a Particular Purpose by Allison Dunham in 37 Minn. L. Rev., 110, (1953).

16Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
1"7Restatement of Contracts § 502 (1932).
18 Dugan v. Bosco, 108 A. 2d 586 (Del. 1954). Contra: Musgrave v. Lucas, 193 Ore.

401, 238 P. 2d 780 (1951); Simons v. Evans, 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S.W.2d 295 (1947);
Clausner v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P. 2d 661 (1941). Cf. Hays v. McGuiness,
208 Ga. 547, 67 S.E. 2d 720 (1951); Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass.
677, 42 N.E. 2d 808 (1942); Dozier v. Hawthorne Development Co., 262 S.W. 2d 705
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In California, the courts began treating this concealment or non-disclosure as actual fraud. 19 In Milhnoe v. Dixon, 20 the purchaser made a personal inspection of the premises and also had an architect and bank appraiser make an examination of the premises. In spite of these inspections,
the court found the seller guilty of actionable fraud. It found the seller
had a duty to disclose the structural defects present and also to disclose

the fact that the building was constructed without a building permit. In a
later case, 21 the defendant concealed the fact of a building code violation
from the plaintiff. The plaintiff inspected the premises and still the court
allowed a rescission of the contract. It found a fraudulent concealment of
fact which the vendor had a duty to disclose. The inspection of the
premises was not enough to offset this duty. That there is a movement

away from the privilege of non-disclosure cannot be denied. It is not a
spectacular movement but a seller of real estate may not find it easy to
22
rely on caveat emptor and thus remain silent.
Suppose the vendor does make a misrepresentation? Formerly, the misrepresentation had to be dishonest in order to hold the vendor.23 Today,
this requirement has been modified or abolished. 24 It is generally held that
when a contract or other bargaining transaction such as a conveyance is
induced by a material misrepresentation by one of the parties to the transaction, the other party may rescind the transaction without respect to
the honesty or diligence of the representer. 2 5 This is usually based on the
(Tenn. 1953). Also see 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., § 902, pp. 550-555.
As to the effect of partial disclosure see Kraft v. Lowe, 77 A. 2d 554 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App., 1950). For a further analysis of the whole problem, see Keeton, Fraud, Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1936).
19 Dyke v. Zaiser, 80 Cal. App. 2d 639, 182 P. 2d 344 (1947); Milmoe v. Dixon, 101
Cal. App. 2d 257, 225 P. 2d 273 (1950); Curran v. Heslop, 115 Cal. App. 2d 476, 252
P. 2d 378 (1953).
20 101 Cal. App. 2d 257, 225 P. 2d 273 (1950).
21 Curran v. Heslop, 115 Cal. App. 2d 476, 252 P. 2d 378 (1953). In Watt v. Patterson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 788, 271 P. 2d 200 (1954), the defendant had no actual knowledge
of the building violation and recission was refused. Also see Barder v. McClung, 93
Cal. App. 2d 692, 209 P. 2d 808 (1949) where the building violated a zoning ordinance.
The purchaser inspected the premises and was not bound by constructive notice of
the zoning ordinance. The purchaser recovered damages on the theory of fraud. Contra: Egan v. Hudson Nut Products, 142 Conn. 344, 114 A. 2d 213 (1955), where nondisclosure of a building violation was not actionable fraud. Also see Restatement Restitution § 8.
22 See, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, V. Page Keeton, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
23Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 3 T. R. 51 (K.B. 1789).
24 See Byars v. Sanders, 215 Ala. 561, 112 So. 127 (1927) where the statement is made,
"He who affirms either what he does not know to be true or knows to be false, to
another's prejudice and his own gain, is both in morality and law, guilty of falsehood
and must answer in damages."
25 Seneca Wire and Manufacturing Co. v. Leach and Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E. 700
(1928).
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theory that the rescission merely restores the parties to their previous
positions and prevents the unjust enrichment of the misrepresenter. 26

In Texas, false and material misrepresentations are deemed to be actionable fraud though innocently made. 27 Thus, exemplary damages were
granted against the vendor where he innocently made misrepresentations
of fact. 28 In Passero v. Loew, 29 a house was represented to be well con-

structed when in fact it was constructed on faulty subsoil which caused
the house to settle and crack. The vendor's innocence was held no defense to an action for damages for fraud. In New Mexico, 30 the fact that
the vendor acted honestly and in good faith in making a misrepresentation
was held to be immaterial. Damages were awarded for actionable fraud.
Further, let us suppose that a misrepresentation could be discovered by
the vendee if he had made an investigation. A basic rule of caveat emptor
is that if a reasonable investigation would uncover the misrepresentation,
then the vendor would not be liable. 31 However, if the vendor is dishonest it is generally held today that he will be liable. 32 In Bobak v.
Mackey, 33 misrepresentation by the vendor that the purchaser could lawfully carry on a light manufacturing business on the premises entitled the
purchaser to recover damages for deceit. The premises were located in a
city zone where such light manufacturing could not be carried on. The
court found that this was a misrepresentation of fact and not law upon
which the purchaser relied. In Oregon, 34 the vendor innocently made false
representations that the house could be used as a multiple family dwelling.
The city code permitted use of the house only as a two family dwelling.
The court overruled the defendant's contention that the purchaser could
have discovered the conditions imposed by the building code by merely
looking at the record. The purchaser still had a right to rely on the ven26 In Dugan v. Bosco, 108 A. 2d 586 (Del., 1954), the vendee discovered the misrepresentation after having converted the house he was sold into apartments. The court still
allowed recission though they would not be restoring the parties to status quo.

This is the rule by statute. Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 4004.
Smith v. Jordan, 220 S.W. 2d 481 (Tex., 1949). The usual rule is that damages
will not be awarded for innocent misrepresentations. Terrene Ltd. v. Nelson, 3 All
E.R. 739 (1937).
29 259 S.W. 2d 909 (Tex., 1953).
30
Ham v. Hart, 50 N.M. 550, 273 P. 2d 748 (1954).
31 Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 379 (1872).
32 Bishop v. Stout Realty Agency, 182 F. 2d 503, 505 (C.A. 4th, 1950). The court said,
"The principle underlying the caveat emptor rule was more highly regarded in former times than it is today; but it was never any credit to the law to allow one who
had defrauded another to defend on the ground that his own word should not have
been believed." See also Walker v. Hustad, 116 Mont. 495, 154 P. 2d 483 (1944), where
a purchaser relied on the vendors fraudulent misrepresentations that the materials were
the best. Contra: Hays v. McGuiness, 208 Ga. 547, 67 S.E. 2d 720 (1951).
33 107 Cal. App. 2d 55, 236 P. 2d 626 (1951).
34 Gamble v. Beahm, 198 Ore. 537, 257 P. 2d 882 (1953).
27

28

too
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dor's representations and rescission was allowed. In Massachusetts, 5 the
vendor innocently misrepresented the assessed value of the real estate for
the current year. The vendee could have ascertained the falsity of the
representation by recourse to records in the assessor's office. Rescission
was allowed.8 6
Very closely allied to actionable misrepresentation is seller's talk or
"puffing." Seller's talk has long been allowed on the theory that it is only
a misstatement of the representer's opinion and as such is not actionable.
There must be a misrepresentation of fact, otherwise caveat emptor
applies.8 7 Massachusetts recently took a dim view of seller's talk. 8 The
Massachusetts supreme court felt the time had come to depart from caveat
emptor in so far as certain kinds of seller's talk was concerned. They felt
that the rule could not be justified on principles of ethics and justice. In
Passero v. LoeW,3 the vendor made the statement that the house to be

sold was well constructed when, in fact, it was not. The court considered
this as a misrepresentation of fact and awarded the vendee damages. A
statement such as this could easily be construed as "puffing" and thus not
actionable as a misrepresentation of opinion. Yet, the court regarded it as
a misrepresentation of fact. In Hays v. McGinness 40 this tendency was
expressed. The courts are tending to restrict seller's talk by regarding
some types of opinion as a misrepresentation of fact.
From all of these cases it can be seen that if a seller of real estate makes
a representation about his property, he will have to stand behind it.41 Is
this not the same movement that took place in the law of sales? 42
Looking elsewhere in the field of land law there is a movement in the
federal government to protect the purchaser. The Federal Housing Ad85

Yorke v. Taylor, 124 N.E. 2d 912 (Mass., 1955).

see Kazwell v. Reynolds, 250 Il. App. 174 (1928), where the court indicates
that a purchaser might have a duty to examine building codes and zoning laws. Another interesting case on misrepresentation is Woldow v. Dever, 374 Pa. 370, 97 A. 2d
777 (1953). In this case the court indicates that the physical appearance of the premises alone without any affirmative action by the vendor can be an actionable misrepresentation. See also Morrow v. Renniere Process, Inc., 222 App. Div. 100, 225 N.Y.
86But

Supp. 250 (lst Dep't, 1927).

Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Manufacturing Co., 248 Fed. 853 (C.A. 2d, 1918).
Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E. 2d 692 (1952).
Followed in Yorke v. Taylor, 124 N.E. 2d 912 (Mass., 1955).
39 259 S.W. 2d 909 (Tex., 1953).
40 208 Ga. 547, 67 S.E. 2d 720 (1951). See also Lewis v. White, 2 Vt. 2d 101, 269 P. 2d
865 (1954) which while recognizing "puffing" restricts it.
41 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a recent misrepresentation case, Lake v.
Thompson, 366 Pa. 352, 77 A. 2d 364 (1951), said that "the law leans toward protecting
even the foolishly credulous against the machinations of those who would defraud."
See also Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
42
See Void, Law of Sales (1st ed., 1931), S 142.
37
8
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ministration and the Veterans' Administration, acting primarily as sureties,
require certain standards of construction before they will insure a loan.
Other non-federal groups like the National Association of Home Builders
have proposed a standard written warranty to be given by builders to the
4
purchaser of a new house. 3

Also, it would seem that a vendor is liable for permissive waste between
the time of contracting and the time of closing. 44 This is sustained either
on a theory of equitable conversion or by an interpretation of the contract which obligates the seller to deliver the property to the buyer in the
condition in which it was, at the time of contracting, reasonable wear and
tear and possible loss from casualty excepted.
The opening of a "show house" for inspection and the selling of other
houses from this model, plans and pictures is comparable to description
selling in the law of sales. 45 By this theory we invoke the warranty that

exists on goods sold by description, i.e., an express warranty that the
goods conform to the description. 46 We can also treat the transaction as a
contract to sell a lot and a contract to build a house. This construction
47
would carry with it promises to perform in a workman-like-manner.
By either theory the purchaser is protected as long as a reasonable in48
spection would not uncover the defect.
Another interesting development in land law is in the area of zoning
law violations. It is well known as a general rule that in the absence of
stipulation, a seller must give a buyer a marketable title. 49 What, then, is a
marketable title? It has been said that every buyer of land has a right to
demand a title which shall put him in all reasonable security against loss
or annoyance by litigation. He should have a title which will enable him
not only to hold his land, but to hold it in peace and if he wishes to sell it,
to be reasonably sure that no flaw will arise to disturb its market value. 50
43 See 4 Western Reserve Law Review 357 (1953).

See Vendor's Liability for Permissive Waste, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 821 (1935).
Williston, Sales S 223 art. 223 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
46 See Weinberg v. Wilensky, 26 N.J. Super 301, 97 A. 2d 707 (1953); Ace Development Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 76 A. 2d 566 (1950). These cases also indicate that
the warrenties survive acceptance of the deed. Also see New Houses and Warranties
44
45

85 L. J. 219 (1938).

47Re v. Magness Construction Co., 117 A. 2d 78 (Del., 1955). See also, Hudson,
Building Contracts 186 (7th Ed., 1946).
48 In Weinberg v. Wilensky, 26 N.J. Super 301, 97 A. 2d 707 (1953), the purchaser
made periodic inspections of the premises. Later he discovered water seepage into the
cellar. Damages for breach of contract were allowed. Also see Laurel Realty Co. v.
Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 72 A. 2d 23 (1950).
49 Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 111.536, 141 N.E. 379 (1923). Also see 55 Amer. Jur.
702 and cases thereunder.
50
Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 111.536, 141 N.E. 379 (1923).
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A purchaser who has bargained for a good title will not be compelled to
take one subject to suspicion; that it must be free from reasonable doubt,
a title to which no reasonable man would object and which a prudent
man would not hesitate to purchase at the market price for a good title. 51
Thus, restrictions upon the use of land or the location and character of
buildings that may be erected thereon, fixed by covenants or other private
restrictive agreements, constitute encumbrances rendering the title un52
marketable.
However, it has been consistently held that a zoning ordinance is not
an encumbrance affecting the marketability of title. 53 The reasons given

to support this theory are varied. In Kazwell v. Reynolds, 54 the court seems
to base its decision on the fact that the ordinance was a matter of record.
They feel it was the duty of the purchaser to have advised himself of such
an ordinance and aptly quote, "ignorantia legis neminem excusat." 55 In
the leading case, Lincoln Trust Co. v Williams Bldg. Corp.,56 the court
said the ordinance simply regulates the use of property and does not discriminate between owners. A person enters into a contract subject to
these ordinances.
What if a seller is using the property in violation of a zoning ordinance
and then sells it? In Moyer v. DeVincentis Construction Co., 57 there was
an ordinance requiring buildings to be set back 25 feet from the street.
The building was only 23 feet from the street. The contract provided
that the property was to be conveyed "free and clear" of all liens and
encumbrances excepting existing restrictions and easements if any and
that "title is to be good and marketable and such as will be insured at
regular rates by any respectable insurance company." The court found
the title unmarketable not because of an existing zoning ordinance, but
because a building had been constructed upon the lot in violation of that
ordinance. The title was in such condition that the purchaser would be
51 Brown v. Cannon, 10 I11.
174 (1848). Deer Park Civic Ass'n. v. City of Chicago,
347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N.E. 2d 823 (1952).
52 See decisions to be found in American Digest System, Vendor and Purchaser 134
(4); 66 C.J. 588 § 909; 55 Am. J. 7020 §246; Maupin, Marketable Title to Real Estate
(3rd Ed.) § 106; Kratovil, Real Estate Law § 174 (1947).
5
3Wheeler v. Sullivan, 90 Fla. 711, 106 So. 876 (1925); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920); Hall v. Risley, 188 Ore. 69, 213
P. 2d 818 (1950); Miller v. Milwaukee Odd Fellows Temple, 206 Vis. 547, 240 N.W.
193 (1932); Kazwell v. Reynolds, 250 I11.
App. 174 (1928); 175 A.L.R. 1056 § 2; 55 Am.

Jur. 705 S250.
54250 111.App. 174 (1928).
55 250 Ill. App. 174, 177 (1928). But see Gamble v. Beahm, 198 Ore. 537, 257 P. 2d 882
(1953) where the court rejected "record notice."
56229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920).
37 107 Pa. Super. 588, 164 Ad. 111 (1933).
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exposed to litigation. It was pointed out that any substantial encroachment of a building on adjoining land of a private owner or the public
renders the title to the land on which the building is located unmarketable. By this analogy, the court found an encroachment in front of the
house. The defendant's contention that the plaintiff had record of the
zoning ordinance and could have ascertained the setback was denied. The
purchaser, even with knowledge, was not required to take such a title
when the contract specifically provided it was marketable.
In Lobmeyer v. Bower,5s on practically the same facts the court relied
on the Moyer case, emphasizing the point that a marketable title must be
one that does not expose the party holding it to the hazards of ligitation.
Again, there was a clause in the contract guaranteeing a marketable title
subject to "all restrictions and easements of record." The court reasoned
that it was not the existence, but the violation of the ordinance that
rendered the title unmarketable.
In Oatis v. Delcuze,50 the court found that the title would be unmarketable if the building violating the ordinance was constructed after the zoning ordinance came into being. They said the purchaser "agreed to purchase the property and not the property plus a probable law suit." 60
What then is the effect of these decisions? It would seem that title companies which insure marketability would be liable on their policies as well
as a grantor upon his covenants for title. 61 Neither a seller nor a title is
relieved from a duty concerning a violation by a contract term excepting
covenants and zoning from the title obligation. Only a clause negating
any duty as to compliance of existing uses would clearly protect a title
62
examiner insuring marketable title.
There is some case law supporting the theory that there is an implied
representation by a vendor that the existing condition of the premises is
legal.63 In Barder v. McLrng,64 the court held that the vendor had a duty
58 170 Kan. 442, 227 P. 2d 102 (1951).
59 226 La. 751, 77 S. 2d 28 (1954). See Lasker v. Patrovsky, 264 Wis. 589, 60 N.V. 2d
336 (1953).
60226 La. 751, 753, 77 2d 28, 31 (1954). Also see Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wash. 2d 159,
201 P. 2d 156 (1948); Hartman v. Rizzuto, 266 P. 2d 539 (Cal., 1954); Josefowicz v.
Porter, 32 N.J. Super 585, 108 A. 2d 865 (1954).
61 See Roberts v. Larsen, 264 App. Div. 880, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 597 (2d Dcp't, 1942).
62 See Building Covenants and Zoning Ordinances, 27 Rocky Mountain L. R. 255
(1955). Also note that many building codes and zoning ordinances provide that a violation is a nuisance and it would seem clear that the existence of a nuisance is an encumbrance. See N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law S 4 (30); Building Code of Chicago (1951)
39-7, 90-4.
68 See Dunham, Vendors' Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 108 (1953).
64 93 Cal. App. 692, 209 P. 2d 808 (1949). Also see Bobak v. Mackey, 121 Cal. App. 2d
554, 263 P. 2d 626 (1951); Gamble v. Beahm, 198 Ore. 537, 257 P. 2d 882 (1953).
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to disclose to the plaintiff that the apartment being sold was maintained
and used in violation of an existing zoning ordinance. The vendor's silence
was a fraudulent misrepresentation upon which the vendee relied. The
court refused the defendant's argument that the vendee had inspected the
premises and was bound by record notice. They said "the purpose of the
recording act is to afford protection not to those who make fraudulent
misrepresentations but to bona fide purchasers for value." 65 The court
awarded damages for fraud. In Morrow v. Renniere Process Inc.,66 where
an existing multiple dwelling violated the occupancy standards of the
New York Multiple Dwelling Law, the court said: "It is thus evident that
the physical appearances of the property was sufficient to constitute a
representation that the property could be applied to the use for which it
'67
ostensibly was designed.
Suppose a building permit is issued and then subsequently a zoning ordinance is passed revoking the permit. In Graham Corp. v. Board of
Zoning Appeals of Town of Greenwich,68 the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that there was no vested right in a mere building permit. Unless work is substantially in the course of construction, the building per70
69
mit may be invalidated as a valid exercise of police power. In Illinois,

the court found there was a vested right in a building permit when the
forms for the foundation had been installed. 71 The subsequent zoning ordinance could not revoke this vested right and the purchaser was protccted.
We began with caveat emptor. We have looked at some of the cases
in the various fields of land law which affect our maxim. Nowhere have
we found a case specifically renouncing it.72 There has been no spectacu-

lar break away from caveat emptor. As time changes, our economy and
society must also change. In order to meet a new legal problem, we do
not cast away our old legal principles. This would leave us with nothing
to rely and depend on. The result would be chaos. Thus, as time and
society change, it is inevitable that a maxim born of time, economy and
society must change. Principles of law such as caveat emptor must be
modified to meet new situations. Today, the situation demands that we
Cal. App. 692, 209 P. 2d 808, 811 (1949).
66222 App. Div. 100, 225 N.Y. Supp. 250 (1st Dep't, 1927).
67 Ibid. at 102 and 252.
68 140 Conn. 1, 97 A. 2d 564 (1953).
69
See Lee Builders v. Wells, 95 A. 2d 692 (Del., 1953).
6593

Deer Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill.
App. 346, 106 N.E. 2d 823 (1952).
71 Contra: Brett v. Building Commissioner, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
72judge Parker in Bishop v. Stout Realty Agency, 182 F. 2d 503, 505 (C.A. 4th, 1950)
said: "The principle underlying the caveat emptor rule was more highly regarded iii
70

former times than it is today."

COMMENTS

modify caveat emptor-that we give more protection to the purchaser. It
has been the purpose of this comment to show that his modification has
begun-Old maxims never die, they just fade away.
SALE BY DESCRIPTION-THE WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY
Under the Uniform Sales Act, as adopted by Illinois and 32 other states,
a sale of goods "by description" has the special legal consequence of imposing upon the seller a "warranty of merchantability":
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.'
Identification of sales by description which would give rise to this warranty is important. The Uniform Sales Act does not define the term, and,
therefore, cases must provide the definition.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Gray2

Gardinerv.
is a very early case involving a warranty of merchantability. Two dealers in silk contracted to buy and sell "waste silk."
The subject matter of the sale was in transit to England, and not subject to
the buyer's inspection. The waste silk when it arrived was not resaleable
as such and the court found that the seller impliedly warranted that it
would be so. In the later case of Jones v. Just,s Manila hemp was the subject of a similar sale. This hemp was, at the time of sale, on board ship
many miles from buyer and seller. Upon arrival, the hemp was found to
have been partially ruined by sea water, and therefore not resalable as
Manila hemp. The court held that the seller by describing the hemp as
Manila hemp impliedly agreed to sell Manila hemp fit for resale. Again the
parties were dealers in the type of goods bought and sold, and not growers or manufacturers.
As the warranty arose, in England it was implied between dealers who
intended to resell the goods. Thus specific goods, 4 not subject to the
scrutiny of the parties, could apparently be the subject of a sale by description. In both the Gardinerand Jones cases the goods were specific in that
they were identified and agreed upon but not subject to inspection. The
seller offered a certain type of goods to the buyer who wished to resell
1 Uniform Sales Act S 15(2).
24 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).

3 [1868] 3 Q.B. 197 (L.R.).
4 Those goods "identified and agreed upon at time a contract to sell or sale is
made." Uniform Sales Act § 76(1).

